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Summary  findings
Demirguic-Kunt and Maksimovic examine the maturity  use less long-term debt, relative to their assets, than do
of firm debt in 30 countries during the period 1980-91.  firms in countries with a tradition  of civil law. Large
They find systematic differences in the use of long-term  firms in common law countries also use less short-term
debt between  industrial and developing countries and  debt.
between small and large firms.  In countries with active stock markets, large firms have
In industrial countries, firms have more long-term debt  more long-term debt and debt of longer maturity.
and a greater proportion  of their total debt is held as  Neither the level of activity nor the size of the market is
long-term debt. Large firms have more long-term debt, as  correlated with financing choices of small firms.
a proportion  of total assets and debt, than smaller firms  By contrast,  in countries with large banking sectors,
do.  small firms have less short-term debt and their debt is of
The authors try to explain the variations in debt  longer maturity. Variation in the size of the banking
composition by differences in the effectiveness of legal  sector does not have a corresponding  correlation with
systems, the development of stock markets and the  the capital structures of large firms. Government
banking sector, the level of government subsidies, and  subsidies to industry increase long-term debt levels of
firm characteristics.  both small and large firms.
In countries with an effective legal system, both large  For all firms, inflation is associated with less use of
and small firms have more long-term debt relative to  long-term debt. The authors also find evidence of
assets and their debt is of longer maturity. Both large and  maturity-matching for both large and small firms.
small firms in countries with a tradition of common law
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at the World Bank Conference on Term Finance in June 1996.Conflicts of interest between the firm's insiders and outside investors are important determinants of
the firm's ability to obtain capital. These conflicts can be mitigated by the appropriate choice of
securities or contracts between the firm and its investors.I An extensive theoretical literature in
corporate finance shows that optimal choice of securities for this purpose depends on the ability of
outsiders to monitor compliance and enforce their legal rights. 2 Since the capacity of investors to
protect their investment depends on the financial and legal institutions, firms' financial structures
should differ systematically across countries. But little is known about how observed differences in
the institutional and legal environments across countries affect the financing choices of firms.
In this paper we examine how differences in financial and legal institutions affect the use of debt,
and in particular, the choice of debt maturity by firms in a sample of 30 countries in 1980-91. The
sample includes both developed and developing countries, and countries with both common law and
civil law based legal systems. We ask four questions.
First, are there any systematic differences in the maturity of debt claims issued by firms in different
countries? Second, if there are, can such differences be accounted for by the characteristics of the
firms in each country? Third, can the differences in the use of debt be explained by institutional
differences, particularly in the development of markets and the enforceability of contracts?
Differences in the use of debt could occur if institutional arrangements in each country facilitate the
use of particular securities to control the opportunistic behavior by firms'  insiders. Finally, is there
evidence that some firms, especially small firms, obtain less long-term debt financing in countries
with less developed financial systems? Financial intermediaries may have a comparative advantage
' The starting  point  for the analysis  of the role of financial  securities  in the resolution  of conflicts  between
different  classes  of stakeholders  are the papers  by Jensen and  Meckling  (1976),  Myers  (1977) and Myers and
Majluf  (1984).  Jensen and Meckling  (1976)  define  the firmn  itself  as a "nexus of contracts."
2For  recent examples  of optimal  financial  structures  when investors  can observe  the firm's cash flows but
cannot enforce  legal rights  to these  cash flows  see Hart  and Moore  (1995) and Bolton  and Scharfstein  (1993).
For a comprehensive  review  of the financial  structure  literature  see Harris  and Raviv  (1990).
Iin monitoring firms, in particular small firms. Thus, access to credit by small firms, which require
extensive monitoring, may depend on the size of the banking sector.
Several authors have explored the effect of the institutional environment on firm financing choices in
specific countries. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) have shown that membership in industrial
groups linked to banks reduces financial constraints on Japanese firms. Calomiris (1993) has
examined the effect of differences between the banking systems of Germany and the United States
on firm financing. Rajan and Zingales (1995) have explored capital structure decisions of firms in
five developed countries and Demirgui-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995) have considered financing
choices in a sample of 10 developing countries.
There have been fewer cross-sectional studies of the effect of financial and legal institutions on firm
financing. Demirgiiu-Kunt and Maksimovic (1  996a) have explored the relationship between firm
growth and access to external finance for a sample of both developed and developing countries. They
show that the proportion of firms in each country that grow at rates that exceed those that can be
financed internally is correlated with the perceived effectiveness of the country's  legal system and
several indicators of financial market and institutional development. 3 Demirgiiu-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1996a) use only one indicator of the effectiveness of a country's  legal system. In a
comparative study of legal systems, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (1996)
have argued the legal tradition on which a country's  legal system is based, as well as several specific
protections, may also be important in determining whether investors can enforce their claims on the
firm's assets. Their paper classifies the legal systems of a sample of countries according to their legal
3Rajan  and Zingales  (1996) independently  examine  the effect of the development  of financial  institutions  on
industry  growth  in a sample  of countries.  Demirgilq-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1996b)  have  explored
complementarities  in stock market  and banking  sector  development  on financing  decision  of firms in a cross-
country  sample  of firms.  Neither  of these  addresses  the question  of debt maturity  or the quality  of enforcement
of contracts  by the legal  systems  in each  country.  Empirical  studies  of debt  maturity,  including  Barclay and
Smith  (1995)  and Stohs  and Mauer  (1996),  have  focused  on term financing  in the United  States only.
2tradition and whether they grant investors those specific protections. In our tests below, we use their
classification of legal systems to supplement an index measuring the effectiveness of each country's
legal system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we take a preliminary look at the
differences in term financing between countries and discuss possible explanations advanced in the
literature. Section 3 discusses the determinants of financial maturity across countries. Section 4
reports cross-sectional empirical tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF TERM FINANCING
Financial theory suggests that a major factor in firms' choice of capital structure is the reduction of
the cost of contracting between firms and their providers of capital. These costs depend both on the
characteristics of firms and the institutional environment in which the contracting takes place. Thus,
since countries have very different institutional systems and different compositions of firms,
observed financial structures should vary systematically both across countries.
We can obtain an initial assessment of the extent of these differences by comparing the long-term
and short-term indebtedness of firms for a sample of countries at different levels of economic
development. Our sample consists of firms in 19 developed economies and I I developing countries
for 1980-91. The developed countries in our sample are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The developing
countries are Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand,
Turkey, and Zimbabwe. 4
4 The selection  of countries  and the variables  discussed  in this section  are described  in detail in Section  3 below.
3Figure 1 displays the average of long-term debt to total asset ratios for firms in our sample for each
of the 30 countries. The developing countries in our sample are denoted by the darker outline.
Norway has the highest ratio of long-term debt to assets, whereas Zimbabwe has the lowest, at about
one-fifth of Norway's.  There is a marked clustering of developing countries at the bottom of the
range, indicating that firms in these countries do not use as much long-term debt financing. Figure 2
displays the ratios of short-term liabilities to total assets. 5 While the tendency is not as clear-cut,
firms in developing countries rely more on short-term financial instruments. This pattern is
confirmed in Figure 3, which displays the ratio of long-term to total liabilities in our sample of
countries. As a proportion of total debt, firms in developing countries use less long-term debt.
The differences in financing patterns across countries reflect differences in institutions and
contracting environments across countries. However, firms with different characteristics may have
different access to financial markets and institutions even within the same economy. Such
differences may be reflected in different financing patterns. Figure 4 depicts the ratios of short-term,
long-term and total indebtedness and the ratio of long-term to total debt by firm size. The firms in
each country in the sample are divided into quartiles by value of total assets, and the average debt
ratios of each quartile, calculated across countries, is reported. Inspection of the figure reveals that
there are marked and consistent differences across quartiles in the use of long-term debt. Large firms
report higher ratios of long-term debt to total assets and long-term debt to total liabilities. By
contrast, there do not appear to be differences in the ratios of short-term debt to total assets across
firm size quartiles.
The figures indicate that there are differences in financing patterns for countries at different levels of
development and for large and small firms. The most pronounced differences are in the use of long-
Note that short-liabilitities  include  trade credit  and other  accounts  payable,  as well as notes payable  to banks.
4term debt contracts. In the remainder of the paper we investigate whether these differences can be
explained by firm characteristics, the characteristics of contracting environments and institutions
across countries.
3 MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS, AND DEBT MATURITY
In order for the firm to obtain outside financing, and in particular loans, the firm must credibly
commit to respect contracts with investors that control opportunistic behavior. The type of contracts
that permit commitment in any particular case depend both on firm characteristics and on the
institutions in the economy that facilitate monitoring and enforcement of financial contracts.
When the legal system is inefficient or costly to use, short-term debt is more likely to be employed
than long-term debt. As Diamond (1991, 1993) has argued, short-term financing may reduce the
expropriation of creditors by borrowers. The short maturity limits the period during which an
opportunistic firm can exploit its creditors without being in default. It allows the creditors to review
the firm's decisions frequently and, if necessary, to vary the terms of the financing before the
sufficient losses have accumulated to make default by the borrower optimal. Thus, we would expect
an inverse relationship between the inefficiency of a country's legal system and the use of long-term
debt.6 To the extent that there are fixed litigation costs in enforcing contracts, long-term debt is likely
to be used most heavily by large firms. The fixed costs may also make the use of long-term debt,
particularly by small firms, less responsive to small year-to-year changes in the economic
environment.
6This  presupposes  the existence  of a trade-off  between  the use of long-term  and short-term  debt. As pointed  out
by Diamond  (1991),  short-term  financing  may give creditors  excessive  control  over the firm's actions.  In
particular,  they  may force  the firm to abandon  valuable  long-run  projects  that  benefit  the owners  if they do not
sufficiently  benefit  the short-term  creditors.  This  situation  is most likely  to occur if  the benefits  received  by the
owners  cannot  be assigned  contractually  to the creditors.
5The government can facilitate the issuance of long-term debt by maintaining a predictable value of
the currency. High, and in particular, variable rates of inflation make it costly for investors and firms
to contract. This problem is compounded when the legal resolution of disputes is subject to delay.7
The government can also promote the use of long-term financing directly by granting implicit loan
guarantees when it adopts a policy of subsidizing loss-making firms or sectors.
Two types of institutions, financial intermediaries and stock-markets, directly influence the financial
structure choices of firms. A prime function of financial intermediaries, such as banks, is that of
monitoring borrowers. As Diamond (1984) argues, intermediaries have economies of scale in
obtaining information. Intermediaries may also have greater incentives to use the collected
information to discipline borrowers than small investors subject to free-rider problems. Thus, we
would expect that a developed banking sector would facilitate access to external finance, particularly
among smaller firms.8 The implications for debt maturity of firms are less clearcut. A developed
banking sector may lead to an increase in the availability of short-term financing, since this form of
financing enables intermediaries to utilize their comparative advantage in monitoring. However, their
economies of scale and their ability to monitor convenants may permit banks to offer long-term loans
that would not be available in a dispersed market. Which of these tendencies predominates is an
empirical question.
Large stock markets provide opportunities for diversification by entrepreneurs. Thus, in countries
with developed stock markets there may be an incentive for firms to substitute from long-term debt
to equity. But stock markets also transmit information that is useful to creditors. As Grossman (1976)
7In  principle  debt contracts  can be indexed.  For example,  in Brazil  all contracts  specify  a government  price
index used to adjust  the nominal  payments  for inflation.  This solution  is not fully satisfactory  in practice.
During  the sample  period the indices  may have  been subject  to risk  of adjustments  made  for political  reasons.
Furthermore,  the judicial system  does not index  judgments,  which  are subject  to appeal  and other  delays.
Perhaps  not coincidentally,  Table I reveals  that  Brazilian  firms  have little long-term  debt.
8 See Rajan  (1992)  for an analysis  of the relationship  between  firms  and financial  intermediaries.
6and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) demonstrate, prices quoted in financial markets at least partially
reveal information that more informed investors possess. 9 This revelation of information may make
lending to a publicly quoted firm less risky. As a result, the existence of active stock markets may
increase the ability of firms to obtain long-term credit. Demirgiiu-Kunt and Maksimovic (I 996b)
provide empirical evidence that in countries with developing financial markets firm debt-equity
ratios increase with an increase in stock market size and activity.
The amount of long-term and short-term debt that is optimal for a firm when financial markets are
perfect in general depends on the opportunities that the firm's insiders have for diverting resources
and on the assets which the firm has to serve as collateral. Thus, theory predicts that firms whose
principal asset is the present value of growth opportunities do not optimally borrow against that asset
(Myers  1977). By contrast, firms with a large quantity of fixed assets already in place do not distort
their incentive value when they borrow. The fixed assets also facilitate borrowing by serving as
collateral. The observed financial structure choices depend on these considerations and on the
institutional factors discussed above. We next investigate the relationship empirically.
9 The incentives  of stock-market  investors  to monitor  the firm  depends  on the ownership  structure.  See Admati,
Pfleiderer  and Zechner  (1994).
73 FIRMS  AND COUNTRIES  IN OUR SAMPLE
3A. Economic  Variables
In Table I we summarize some important facts about the economic development of the countries in
our sample.'0 The gross domestic product per capita (GDP/CAP) is a broad indicator of differences
in wealth in each country. In 1991 GDP/CAP in the sample ranged from $27,492 in Switzerland to
$359 in Pakistan. Thus, the sample includes some of the richest and poorest countries in the world.
Three additional macroeconomic indicators are presented in Table I. The average annual growth rate
of the gross domestic product over the sample period may be an indicator of the financing needs of
firms. On an individual firm level, the existence of growth opportunities may also affect the optimal
financing of projects (Myers 1977). The average inflation rate over the sample period, shown in the
third column, provides both an indicator of the government's management of the economy and
evidence on whether the local currency provides a stable measure of value to be used in long-term
contracting. There are major variations in the average rate of inflation in the sample countries. The
average annual rate of inflation is highest in Brazil, at 327.6 percent,  and lowest in Japan at 1.5
percent a year.
The final economic indicator shown in Table I is a measure of the government's subsidies to the
corporate sector in each country. Government subsidies affect financial structure decisions because
implicit or explicit backing of corporations by the government may distort market incentives and
permit some firms to obtain long-term loans on favorable terms. I  IOur measure of the government's
subsidies is the level of government grants as a percentage of the gross domestic product. More
10  The sources  for the variables  discussed  in  this section  are given in  the Appendix.
" The Dome Petroleum Harvard  Business  School  case  provides  a graphic  illustration  of the effect of implicit
government  loan  guarantees  on financial  structure  Their  effect is qualitatively  similar  to that of deposit
insurance  in the banking sector.  For a discussion  of deposit  guarantees  see Kane (1989).
8precisely, we measure the sum of grants on current account by the public authorities to (i) private
industries and public corporations and (ii) government enterprises to compensate for the losses which
are the consequence of policies of the public authorities.12  As the last column of Table I reveals, the
level of government subsidies is significant is some countries, and exceeds 10 percent of the GDP in
the case of Brazil.
3B. Legal and Financial Institutions
We explore the relationship between firms' financing choices and the state of development of both
the legal and the financial institutions in our sample of countries. The principal indicators of legal
and financial development are given in Table II.
Legal Institutions
We expect that high incomes, measured by gross domestic product per capita, to be positively
correlated with the effectiveness of state institutions that enforce contracts, and thus, of the effect of
the legal environment on financial structure decisions. As a more direct indicator of the efficiency of
the legal system in each country, we use a commercially available index of the level of law and order
in each country, LAWORDER. This index, prepared by the International Country Risk Guide is
scored on a six point scale and aggregates annual reports by a panel of more than a hundred analysts.
It measures the extent to which citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions
to make and implement laws and to adjudicate disputes. Low levels of the index denote less reliance
on the legal system to mediate disputes. A second indicator, the index of legal efficiency, produced
by Business International Corporation is also presented for comparison. This second indicator is an
12 Thus,  this variable  measures  realized  expenditures  but not direct  instructions  to business  or the level of ex-
ante commitments  made  by each government.  Over a period,  we would  expect  a correlation  between
commitments  and expenditures.
9index of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, and in particular
foreign firms. This index is scored from zero to ten, with lower scores indicating lower efficiency.
LLSV have argued that legal systems based on common law may offer investors different protections
than those based on civil law.  Such differences may translate into differences in the optimal
contracts between firms and investors. To test for this relationship we follow LLSV in defining an
indicator variable, COMMON, which is one if the country's legal system is based on common law
and zero if it based on civil law. As Table II reveals, the legal systems of thirteen countries in our
sample are based on common law and those of seventeen countries are based on civil law.
Financial structure choices may also be affected by the specific provisions of each countries
commercial laws. To investigate further the effect of differences in legal systems we use the
indicators of creditor and shareholder rights compiled and discussed in detail LLSV. LLSV classify
countries according to whether they provide creditors with the following five specific protections.
First, whether the bankruptcy laws prohibit an automatic stay on assets, which would prevent
automatic liquidations of insolvent firms by secured creditors. The existence of an automatic stay
benefits managers and shareholders over secured creditors.14  Second, whether secured creditors are
permitted to repossess their collateral in bankruptcy or whether some third party claims, such as
those of the government or the employees take priority. Third, whether the bankruptcy law prohibits
borrowers from unilaterally obtaining court protection from creditor demands. If distressed
borrowers can obtain such protection unilaterally, their bargaining power is increased. Fourth,
whether creditors can dismiss managers and replace them with administrators when a firm becomes
bankrupt. In addition, LLSV note whether the law of each country requires all firms to maintain a
3 Watson  (1974) discusses  differences  in legal  traditions  based  on common  law and on civil law.
14 Note that this provision  may also benefit  unsecured  creditors  over secured  creditors.
10reserve of equity capital. In countries where this requirement exists, firms that do not fulfill it may be
dissolved.
In principle, the creditor rights identified are important in defining feasible contracts between firms
and investors. However, there may be no direct statistical relationship between the existence of a
specific right and a specific financial contract, such as long-term debt, even when that right is
important in enforcing the contract. For example, if the existence of a specific right is necessary, but
not sufficient, to make a financial contract enforceable, the statistical relationship between that right
and the use of the contract may be weak. The relationship between a particular creditor protection
and particular debt contract may also be affected by the existence of spillover effects of the creditor
protection on other contracts. For example, strong creditor rights may increase the incentives of
financial institutions to monitor firms, thereby also making stock investments in those firms more
attractive. The size of these spillovers may depend on the development of the stock market and
financial institutions and on the precise provisions of the investor protection laws. Spillovers may
also work in the opposite direction. In some, but not all, countries financial intermediaries hold both
the stocks and debt of corporations.  As a result, intermediaries with an equity stake in a firm may
be willing to make loans even when creditor protection is relatively weak.
With these caveats in mind, our examination of the relationship between specific creditor protections
and financial structure is exploratory in nature. We give each country a score on an empirically
defined "index of creditor rights" based on whether its laws grant creditors the legal protections
identified above. Specifically, we give each country a score of one for each of the following
conditions that its bankruptcy law satisfies: (i) does not permit an automatic stay on assets, (ii) does
not allow borrowers to unilaterally seek bankruptcy protection, (iii) assures secured creditors the
15 Hauswald  (1996) examines  how ownership  of both  stock and equity  by intermnediaries  alters  their incentives
to reorganize  firms in distress.
11right to collateral, and (iv) does not grant the managers tenure pending resolution of bankruptcy. If
corporations are requited to maintain a capital reserve, then the size of that reserve as a proportion of
assets is added to the index. The index is presented in Table 2. Scores range from a high of 4 and a
low of 0.1. Some developing countries, such as India and Pakistan, score highly, whereas some
developed countries, like France and Germany, have low scores. In addition to using our empirical
index of creditor rights, in the regressions below we also test separately for the effect of each
component of the creditor rights index.
We proxy for the rights of shareholders using an index developed by LLSV. This index is scored on
a scale of one to five. It is obtained by adding a score of one for each of the following elements
fulfilled: (i) if sharholders are allowed to vote by mail, (ii) if they are not required to deposit their
shares with a trustee prior to voting, (iii) if the law allows cummulative voting for directors and (iv)
if the law gives minority shareholders special protection, and (iv) if the minimum percentage of
share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary general meeting is less than or
equal to 10 percent. This index measures the costs faced by minority investors who want to influence
decisionmaking within the firm, and is presented, for completeness, in Table II.
The index is subject to the same caveats as the index of creditor rights presented earlier. Whether the
costs faced by small shareholders when exercising their rights are important in determining firms'
financial structure decisions will depend on whether there also exist large investors or financial
intermediaries that can enforce shareholder rights. If these large investors exist, then costs faced by
small outside investors may not be material in determining financing patterns.
12Financial Institutions
Access to publicly traded equity markets is measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to
gross domestic product (MCAP/GDP).16  Within our sample there is considerable variation in this
ratio, ranging from 1.35 in South Africa to 0.04 in Pakistan. Interestingly, in some of the more
developed countries, such as Italy, the MCAP/GDP is lower than is some of the developing
countries, such as Malaysia (0.15 compared with 0.88, respectively).'7
In addition to size, we also measure the activity in the stock markets of each country. The activity
level of the equity markets is measured by the tumover ratio (TOR), computed by dividing the total
value traded by the market capitalization. Higher values of the turnover ratio indicate a higher level
of liquidity. As noted above, a high turnover may also increase the incentives for investors to become
informed. Thus, a high turnover may facilitate external monitoring of corporations. This variable was
found to be a good indicator of stock market development by Demirgii,-Kunt and Levine (1995) and
Demirgiiu-Kunt and Maksimovic (I 996a,b).
Access to financial intermediaries by firms is measured by the ratio of the domestic assets of deposit
banks to the gross domestic product. Again, there are wide variations across countries, both within
the developed countries (for example, Japan has a ratio of 1.2 while the United States has a ratio of
0.48) and developing countries (compare Malaysia at .77 with Turkey at 0.25).
3C Firm Specific  Characteristics
An important consideration in the choice of financial structure by firms is the reduction of agency
costs. The particular types of agency costs to which the firm is exposed and their magnitude will in
16 See Demirgiiu-Kunt  and  Levine  (1995) for a discussion  of alternative  indices  of stock market  development.
The statistics  on financial  markets  and intermediaries  quoted  in  this paragraph  are compiled  in that paper.
7 For a discussion  of the determinants  of market  size see Pagano  (1993)  and Allen and Gale (1994).
13general vary from firm to firm. Thus, the observed differences in financial structures in our sample
of countries depend in part on the characteristics of the population of firms in each economy. We
control for the differences in firm characteristics between countries by introducing firm-specific
variables that are suggested by theory and that are empirically useful in explaining financial structure
decisions of individual firms in a subset of our sample (Demirgii-Kunt  and Maksimovic  1995).
The firm-level data for the developed economies are taken from Global Vantage. We include all the
countries in the database for which there are more than 40 firms available.  The firm-level data for
developing countries are from the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) database. They consist
of financial statement data for approximately one hundred largest publicly traded corporations in
these economies. The data are described in detail, together with primary  sources, in Singh, Hamid,
Salimi and Nakano (1992).  19 For both databases, the number of firms available in each country and
the years available are listed in the Appendix.
Two of the firm specific variables we use are descriptors of the firm's operating characteristics. The
ratio of net fixed assets of firms to their total assets (NFATA) is an indicator of the structure of the
firm's assets. Fixed assets may serve as collateral debt. Thus, firms with a high ratio of fixed assets
may have greater borrowing capacity. Moreover, since firms have been found to match the maturity
of assets with that of liabilities in the United States (Stohs and Mauer 1995), NFATA may be
correlated with long-term leverage. The ratio of net sales to net fixed assets (NSNFA) is a descriptor
of the firm's operating cycle. A firm with high NSNFA may need short-term financing to support
18 Outliers,  many of them obvious  data errors,  were removed  prior to analysis.  To standardize  the procedure,  for
each variable  we computed  the interval  between  the  9 5th  percentile  and  the 5th percentile  observations.  Outliers
were defined  as observations  that  did not lie within  a band centered  on the median observation  and having  a
width twelve  times the length  of the computed  interval.  Fewer  than one percent  of observations  were eliminated
in this way.
19 Singh, Hamid,  Salimi  and Nakano  (1992)  does not list  the primary  sources  for  the data for Brazil,  which
were gathered  after that technical  report was prepared.  The data were collected  from the publications  of the
Vargas  Foundation  of Brazil.
14sales. It may generate short-term assets, such as cash, accounts receivables and notes from its
customers. Thus, if firms match the maturity of their assets and liabilities, a high ratio of NSNFA
will be associated with short-term indebtedness.
Two variables measure the cash constraints of firms. A high ratio of dividends to total assets, DIVTA
suggests that the firm has a cash surplus relative to its investment needs. Firms in this position would
be expected to reduce their leverage. The second indicator of liquidity is the ratio of the firms
earnings before interest and taxes to its total assets (PROFIT). Several studies have found a strong
negative relationship between this variable and leverage, both in the United States (e.g., Spence
1985) and in developing countries (Demirguq-Kunt and Maksimovic 1995a). 2 0
The preliminary evidence presented in the figures above suggests that the financing decisions of
large and small firms may be differently determined. Accordingly, for the most part we analyze them
separately. For each economy we divide our panel of firms into quartiles based on asset size. Our
sample of large firms consists of the largest quartile of firms in each country. The sample of small
firms consists of firms in that quartile of firms in each country which most closely approximates the
smallest quartile of firms in our developing countries in size, where size is measured by the ratio of
firm's assets to the economy's gross domestic product. Thus, the firms in this sample have
approximately the same size relative to their economies. For each country, the firm-specific variables
are constructed by taking annual averages of the values for the sub-samples of large and small firms
separately.
20 Firms' capital structures  also depend  on the tax advantages  of debt and  equity  financing.  See  Swoboda  and
Zechner  (1995)  for a comparative  discussion  of tax systems.  Several  factors  make the effect  of tax incentives  on
the capital  structures  of firms  difficult  to quantify.  The complexity  of tax systems,  with  both federal  and local
taxes, makes  it difficult  to compare  the benefits  debt across  a large sample  of countries.  As shown  by Graham  et
al (1996),  effective  tax rates  may significantly  differ from statutory  tax rates.  Moreover,  our interest  is not on
the total amount  of debt that a firm  has, but on the composition  of the firm's debt and  the ratio of long-term  to
short-term  debt.  The implications  of different  tax systems  for the composition  of debt and for debt maturity  are
not clearcut.  As a result, we do not include  tax variables  in our cross-sectional  regressions.
15We present correlations matrices for the variables in Table III. Simple correlations between country
means of the variables of interest (LTDTA, STDTA, and LTDTD) and the explanatory variables are
shown in Table IIIA for large and small firms separately. The two variables measuring for the
effectiveness of the legal system, LAWORDER and LEGAL, are significantly correlated with all of
our financial structure variables. The effectiveness of the legal system is highly correlated with
greater reliance on long-term debt and smaller reliance on short-term debt. The signs of the
correlations between the financial structure variables and the gross domestic product per capita
parallel those between the financial structure variables and the legal effectiveness variables.
However, the correlations with the legal effectiveness variables are higher and more statistically
significant. Of the other legal variables, the most interesting correlations are with the creditor rights
index. High scores on the index of creditor rights are associated with a greater reliance of short-term
debt over long-term debt and lower absolute levels of the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. This is
consistent with the argument by Diamond (1991) that lenders that engage in monitoring have an
incentive to make short maturity loans. The correlations between the financial structure variables and
two other legal variables, the index of shareholder rights and the dummy for common law are of
smaller magnitude. Finally, correlations involving the institutional and firm-specific control
variables show less evidence of statistical significance.
Panel IIIB explores the raw correlations between the explanatory variables using data for all firms in
the sample, regardless of size. The legal effectiveness variables, LAWORDER and the LEGAL, are
highly positively correlated with income per capita, and with the existence of a large banking sector.
The relationship between these variables and the other institutional variables are mixed. However,
firms in countries with an effective legal system, as measured by both these variables, tend to have a
lower ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, to be on the average less profitable and to pay out lower
dividends then firms in countries with less effective legal systems.
16The three legal variables that measure specific characteristics of the legal system show fewer
significant correlations. As pointed out by LLSV, countries with a common law tradition have better
shareholder and creditor rights. However, in these countries the correlation with shareholder rights is
stronger, indicating a relative predilection for protecting shareholders. This may be one of the
explanations for the positive correlation that we observe between the common law dummy variable
and MCAP/GDP and the negative correlation between this dummy and BANK/GDP.
Inspection of the table also reveals that countries with large banking systems tend to have higher
ratios of market capitalization to gross domestic product. This finding has also been reported by
Levine and Demirgiuc-Kunt  (1995). Large banking systems are also negatively correlated with
inflation. Finally, it is interesting to note that firms in countries with larger banking systems have
lower ratios of net fixed assets to total assets. This would be consistent with the hypothesis that
financial intermediaries have a greater willingness to lend against short-term assets, perhaps as a
result of their ability to monitor corporations.
Table IV presents summary statistics for the variables we use in the regressions reported below.
4 DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL  STRUCTURE
Differences in institutions between countries may affect the borrowing of firms in developed and
developing countries in two ways. First, these differences may affect the absolute levels of long-term
and short-term borrowing. Second, they may create incentives to alter the mix of long-term and
short-term debt. Accordingly, we analyze both and the ratio of long-term to total debt and the levels
of long-term and short-term debt relative to total assets.
Significant changes in the legal systems of countries from year to year are rare, and the indicators of
investors legal protections do not vary over time. Accordingly, we investigate the determinants of
17financial structure in a cross-section, taking as our observations the time-series country means of
each variable. This specification, estimated using White's adjustment for heteroscedasticity, is
reported in Panels A-C of Tables V. 21
4.1 Long-Term Debt
Panel A of Table V presents OLS regressions explaining the ratio of long-term debt to total assets
(LTD/TA) for the largest and smallest quartiles of firms in each country over the sample period.
Column (1) of Panel A reports the regression of LTD/TA of large firms on the gross domestic
product per capita. GDP/CAP measures systematic differences that exist in corporate long-term
indebtedness between richer and poorer economies. For large firms this variable "explains," 44
percent of the differences in long-term financing over the sample period. The positive coefficient,
significant at the I percent level, indicates that sample corporations in richer countries use long-term
financing more. The size of the coefficient indicates that differences in the GDP per capita in our
sample are associated with very different levels of long-term debt. Thus, a relatively small $1,000
increase in the GDP per capita (the difference between, say, Pakistan and Thailand) translates into an
increment of 0.09 in the value of the ratio of long term debt to total assets. Increases of $10,000 in
the GDP per capita (the difference between, say, Pakistan and Singapore) translates into an increase
of 0.09 in long-term leverage, whereas differences between some of the richest and poorest countries
in the sample (the difference of approximately $20,000 between, say, Pakistan and Norway) is
associated with an impressive increase of 0.18 in the value of the ratio of long-term debt to total
assets.
21 We have also  estimated  panel  regressions  in which  each financial  structure  variable  of interest  is regressed  on
the explanatory  variables  and country  and year dummies.  This  specification  is potentially  misspecified  because
it treats  cross-sectional  and time-series  variation  equally.  Moreover,  annual  observations  may not be
independent.  However,  it has the advantage  of using all the data, and  was reported  in an earlier  version of this
paper.  Below  we note some additional  insights  suggested  by the panel  results.
18The results of corresponding regression of the LTD/TA of small firms on GDP per capita are
qualitatively similar. Together with dummies, GDP per capita "explains" 41 percent of the variation
in the panel. However, the coefficient of GDP per capita indicates that the variation in the use of
long-term debt in richer and poorer countries by larger and smaller firms is of similar magnitude. For
both large and small firms, GDP per capita loses significance when the model is augmented with our
institutional explanatory variables.
In the remainder of Panel A we attempt to determine what specific institutional variables explain
differences in the use of debt between countries. In columns (2) and (4) we regress the LTD/TA on
the full set of firm-specific and institutional variables and on our indicators of legal system for large
and small firms respectively. There is high degree of consistency between results of the large and
small firms' cross-sectional equations. Two results pertaining to the legal environment are of
particular interest. First, reliance on long-term debt by both large and small firms is higher in
countries with an effective legal system.22  This finding is consistent with the findings of Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) that the effectiveness of the legal system is highly correlated with
external financing of firm growth. Second, both large and small firms in countries with the common
law tradition have less long-term debt. Of the investor rights variables, only the index of shareholder
rights is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and only for the large firm equation. The
positive coefficient indicates that shareholder rights are associated with a greater use of long-term
debt. Interestingly, high values of the index of creditor rights are not correlated with the use of long-
term debt. We explore the role of creditor rights in more detail below.
22 In the reported  equations  the efficiency  of the legal  system  is measures  by the variable  LAWORDER. The
variable  LEGAL  is not used since  this index is targeted  towards  foreign  firms.  When  this variable  is entered
instead  of LAWORDER,  its coefficient  was of the same  sign, although  not always  signficant,  and if so, at a
lower level.
19Of the financial institutions variables, only the coefficient of the stockmarket's  turnover ratio, TOR,
is significant. 23 It is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in the large firm equation, and
positive and significant at the 10 percent level in the small firm equation. These coefficients indicate
that an active stock market is associated with a higher long-term leverage, more clearly so in the case
of large firms. This result is consistent with the finding that shareholder rights are associated with
higher long-term leverage of large firms, reported above.
Our indicator for the size of the intermediary sector, measured by the ratio of bank assets to the gross
domestic product, does not explain cross-sectional variation in the use of long-term debt by either
small or large firms. However, extensive government subsidies are associated a high ratio of long-
term debt to assets for both large and small firms.
Two of the control variables are also significant in both equations. High average rates of inflation are
negatively related to the use of long-term debt for both large and small firms. High average net fixed
asset to total asset ratios are associated with a higher ratio of long-term debt to total assets. This is
consistent with the notion that fixed assets may serve as good collateral for long-term debt. 24
Taken together, the results suggest that for both large and small firms, the observed variation in the
levels of long-term debt across countries is related to the effectiveness of the legal system, the
liquidity of the stock market, the availability of collateral, the rate of inflation and the level of
government subsidies. There is some evidence that increased shareholder protection increases the
amount of long-term debt used by large firms. 25
23 The stock  market  size variable  MCAP/GDP  is not included  in the reported  specifications  since it is not
significant.  This  is consistent  with  the results  in Demirgfl9-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1996a).
24 Neither  PROFIT  nor DIVTA  variables  develop  significant  coefficients,  when entered  into the regression
equation together or separately. To conserve degrees of freedom, DIVTA was dropped from subsequent
regressions.
25 Panel results  suggest  that year  to year  within  country  variations  in  the explanatory  variables  may affect large
and small firms differently. Within countries, changes in the use of long-term by large firms is related to
204.2 Short-Term Debt
Panel B of Table V examines cross-country variation in the use of short-term debt. In contrast with
the long-term debt equations reported in Panel A, for both large and small firms, cross-sectional
variation in the gross national product per capita by itself does not explain differences in the use of
short-term debt. Since the gross national product per capita is a proxy for the effectiveness of
institutions, this finding suggests that cross-country institutional differences are less important in
explaining differences in the use of short-term debt. The estimates of the expanded specification (2)
confirm this.
For large firms, the coefficients of two legal indicator variables are significant. Large firms in
countries with more effective legal systems have less short-term debt. The same is true for countries
whose legal system is based on common law. However, we do not find that the use of short-term
debt by small firms is affected either by the effectiveness of the legal system or by whether or not the
legal system is based on common law. The indices of shareholder or creditor rights do not help
explain the use of short-term debt for either large or small firms.
The coefficient of only one of the financial system variables is statistically significant. Small firms in
countries with a large banking sector have less short-term debt. Cross-country variation in the stock
market or in values of the indices of investor protection does not help explain differences in the
changes in  the efficiency  of the legal system,  the level of government  subsidies  and the activity  level in the
stock market.  These factors  were not associated  with  changes  in the use of long-term  debt by small firms in the
panel regressions.  This  difference  may occur because  small  firms,  which  may  have less access  to financial
markets,  governmental  subsidies  and  the legal system,  are less  likely  to be affected  by marginal  improvements
in financial  markets  and the legal system  and changes  in the level of subsidies.  This  is consistent  with  the
additional  finding  that  within country  variation  in long-term  borrowing  by small  firms  was more  strongly
related  to yearly  changes  in  the size of the banking  sector.  By contrast,  the cross-sectional  differences  between
countries  that  we measure  in the paper are likely  to be of a greater  magnitude.  Thus,  they affect small  firms as
well as large firms.
21usage of short-term debt. Similarly, the indicator of government subsidies as a fraction of the gross
domestic does not improve the explanatory power of the regressions.
Inspection of columns (2) and (4) reveals that several firm-specific variables help explain short-term
leverage. One of these variables, the ratio of net sales to net fixed assets NSNFA is positively
associated with short-term borrowing for both small and large firms. A high ratio of net fixed assets
to total assets is associated with lower levels of short-term borrowing for large firms. This is
consistent with the notion that such firms more easily match the maturity of borrowing with the
maturity of their assets. Thus, large firms with fixed assets may borrow long-term in preference to
short-term borrowing. Interestingly, more profitable large firms have more short-term debt, whereas
we do not obtain a similar significant relationship for small firms. Small firms that grow fast rely
more heavily on short-term debt. This finding is consistent with Myers (1977) hypothesis that growth
options are not financed using long-term debt.
4.3 Debt Maturity
We explore how the maturity of the firm's liabilities varies across countries in Panel C. As our
indicator of maturity, we utilize the ratio of long-term liabilities to total-liabilities. The specifications
used parallel the regressions reported in Panels A and B. However, to control for the firm's total debt
level we add the lagged ratio of total liabilities to total assets to the explanatory variables to the
specifications in Panel C.
The coefficients of debt maturity on the gross domestic product per capita indicate that firms in more
developed countries have debt of longer maturity. The results of cross-country regressions of debt
maturity on firm-specific and institutional variables are consistent with the results for long-term and
short-term debt reported above. The indicator of the legal system's  efficiency in settling disputes,
22LAWORDER, is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in the large firm equation and positive
significant at the 10 percent level in the small firms equation. Thus, we find evidence that the higher
the quality of legal institutions, the greater the proportion of long-term financing. There is also some
evidence that the maturity of debt is longer for small firms in common law countries (the coefficient
of the dummy COMMON is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in the small firm
equation (2). There is no evidence of a similar significant effect for the largest firms in each country.
These results are consistent with the previous finding that both large and small firms in common law
countries use less long-term debt and that large firms only in common law countries use less short-
term debt.
Consistent with the previously reported results, large firms in countries with active stock markets
have longer maturity of debt. Interestingly, small firms in countries with large banking systems also
have debt of longer maturity. Together with the finding that small firms in countries with large
banking systems have less short-term debt, this finding suggests that a large banking sector enables
small firms to extend the maturity of their debt.
The coefficients of several of the control variables are of interest. The coefficient of inflation is
negative for both large and small firms, but is only significant in former case. High ratios of sales of
net sales to net fixed assets are negatively associated with long-maturity of debt for both large and
small firms. Small firms in countries that are growing fast have less debt than small firms in slow
growing countries. A high ratio of net fixed assets to total assets and high profits are negative and
significant in the large firm equation. They are also negative, but not significant in the small firm
equation.
234.4 Specific Legal Protections
In Table V we find no evidence that the index of creditor rights helps predict either short-term and
long-term leverage or debt maturity. In this subsection we explore the relationship between creditor
rights and debt levels in more detail. To this end, we replace the creditor rights index by its
individual components in the large-firm and small-firm cross-sectional equations in Panels A-C of
Table V. Table VI shows the coefficients of the individual components of the index in these
equations. For convenience, we also present the coefficients of the index from Panels A-C of Table
V.
Inspection of Table VI reveals that the variation in most of the components of the creditor rights
index in this sample is not significantly related to the debt composition decisions of large firms. The
one exception is variation in the right of secured creditors to seize collateral in bankruptcy. This right
is associated with increased short-term borrowing and a significantly shorter maturity of debt for
large firms. The interpretation of a significant partial correlation between any single legal protection
and the use of a financial contract must be tentative because the importance of the protection may
vary in different systems. However, this partial correlation is consistent with the proposition that
short-term lenders may have a greater incentive to monitor borrowers and benefit most from an
ability to repossess secured assets, as suggested by Diamond (1991). Interestingly, the rights of
secured creditors are not similarly correlated with the financing decisions of small firms. 26
Small firms in countries whose laws allow managers to stay in control during reorganizations have
significantly less short-term debt. As a result of this, the ratio of long-term debt to short-term debt is
higher for these firms in such countries. Again, interpretation must be tentative. It is however, also
26 Note that is some  countries,  such as the United  States,  trade  creditors  may possess  rights which  other secured
creditors  do not possess.  Thus,  systematic  differences  in  the amount  of trade  credit  used by large  and small
firms  would  confound  our results.
24consistent with the conjecture that more monitoring occurs with short-term debt, and that the
availability of short-term financing is reduced when the ability of creditors to act in protection of
their interests is curtailed.
Table VI provides some evidence that small firms in countries where there exists an automatic stay
on assets of bankrupt firms borrow more, although the maturity of their debt remains unaffected. In
bankruptcy, an automatic stay benefits borrowers at the expense of secured creditors. Thus, owners
of small firms may wish to borrow more if the automatic stay credibly commits lenders not to
expropriate them in the event that their firms become financially distressed.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We examine maturity of firms' liabilities in thirty developed and developing countries during 1980-
91. We find systematic differences in the use of long term debt between developed and developing
countries and small and large firms. In developed countries firms have more long term debt and
greater proportion of their total debt is held as long term debt. This is true regardless of firm size
across our sample of countries. Also large firms have more long term debt- as a proportion of total
assets and debt- compared to smaller firms. We attempt to explain the observed cross-country
variation leverage and maturity of liabilities by differences in the legal systems, financial
institutions, government subsidies, as well as firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors, such
as the rate of inflation and the economy's growth rate.
We find that both large and small firms in countries with legal systems that are perceived to be
effective have more long-term debt relative to assets and that their debt is of longer maturity. Large
firms in countries with effective legal systems have lower short-term liabilities, suggesting that such
firms may be substituting long-term debt for short-term debt. We do not find evidence of a similar
25reduction in short-term liabilities by small firms, perhaps because small firms tend to use less long-
term debt than large firms. These conclusions are consistent with the findings of Demirgiiu-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1996) that a higher proportion of firms in countries with effective legal systems
finance their growth externally.
We also test the hypothesis that tradition on which a country's  legal systerm  is based may influence
the optimal financing of firms in that country. We find that both large and small firms in countries
with a common law tradition use less long-term debt, relative to their assets, than firms in countries
with a civil law tradition. Large firms in common law countries also use less short-term debt. The
maturity of debt of large firms in common law and civil law countries does not differ significantly,
whereas it is longer for small firms.
The structure of financial institutions is also an important determinant of firms' financing choices.
Consistent with Demirguic-Kunt  and Maksimovic (1996) results on external financing of investment,
we find that whereas the variation in the size of the stock market relative to the country's economy is
not correlated with financing patterns, variation in the level of activity of the stock market does have
explanatory power for large firms. In countries with active stock markets large firms have more
long-term debt and debt of longer maturity. Neither the level of activity nor the size of the market is
correlated with financing choices of small firms. By contrast, in countries with a large banking
sector, small firms have less short-term debt and their debt is of longer maturity. Variation in the size
of the banking sector does not have a corresponding correlation with the capital structures of large
firms. Thus, at the margin large banking sectors enable smaller firms to substitute long-term debt for
short-term debt.
We also find that the magnitude of government subsidies to industry is positively related to the use
of long-term debt by both large and small firms, perhaps as a result of implicit guarantees. Inflation
26is negatively related to the use of long-term debt. Variation in several of the firm-specific
characteristics is also related to the use of debt of different maturities. In particular, high ratios of net
fixed assets to total assets are positively related to the use of long-term debt by both large and small
firms and less short-term borrowing by large firms only. This finding suggests that large firms can
more easily use their fixed assets obtain long-term debt. By contrast, high ratios of sales to fixed
assets are associated with more extensive use of short-term debt. This would be consistent with
maturity matching if firms with high ratios of sales to fixed assets also have high ratios of accounts
receivable to fixed assets.
In sum, the underlying legal and institutional differences explain a large portion of the variation in
the use of long-term debt. While we have identified relationships between financial institutions and
legal system origin and efficiency, on the one hand, and financial structures of firms, we have been
not been able to consistently relate specific investor protections with firm financing. This is not
surprising because the constraints that specific features of the legal system impose of contracting by
firms and investors may be depend on the characteristics of the financial system in each country. The
exact way in which this happens is an open research question.
The paper has several policy implications. First, it provides evidence confirming that firms in
developing countries have less long term debt, even after accounting for their characteristics.
Second, the paper shows that this lack of term finance is mainly due to institutional differences, such
as the extent of government subsidies, different level of development of stock markets and banks,
and differences in the underlying legal infrastructure. Third, the results indicate that while policies
that help develop legal and financial infrastructure of countries are effective in increasing the access
of firms to long term debt, different policies would be necessary to lengthen the debt maturity of
large and small firms. Improvements in legal effectiveness seem to benefit all firms, although this
result is much less significant for the smallest firms, which have limited access to the legal system.
27Similarly, policies that would help improve the functioning and liquidity of stock markets, would
again benefit mostly the large firms. In contrast, policies that would lead to improvements in the
development of the banking system would improve the access of smaller firms to long term credit.
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Figure 1. Long Term Debt/Total Asset Ratios. The figure presents  the average long-term debt to total asset
ratios for firmns  in each country for 1980-91. Developing countries are denoted by the darker outline. The
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Figure 2. Short Term Debt/Total Asset Ratios. The figure presents the average short-termn  debt to total asset
ratios for firms in each country for 1980-91. Developing countries are denoted by the darker outline. The
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Figure 3. Long Term Debt/Total Debt Ratios. The figure presents the average long-term debt to total debt
ratios  for firms  in each  country  for  1980-9 1. Developing  countries  are denoted  by the darker  outline.  The
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Figure  4.  Debt  Ratios: Small  vs.  Large Firms. The figure  presents the  average  long-term  debt  to  asset
(LTD/TA), short-term debt to asset (STD/TA), total debt to total asset (TD/TA) and long-term debt to total debt
(LTD/TD) ratios across thirty countries by firm size. The firms in each country are divided into quartiles  by
value  of total  assets, and  the  average debt  ratios of  each  quartile, calculated  across countries,  is reported.
Countries  in the  sample  are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,  Germany, Finland,  France,  Hong
Kong, India,  Italy, Jordan,  Japan, Korea,  Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New  Zealand, Pakistan,




GDP/CAP is the real GDP per capita in US$ in 1991. It is obtained from World Bank National Accounts. Growth rate is the
average annual growth rate in GDP/CAP for 1980-91. Average annual inflation is given for 1980-91. It is the annual inflation of
the GDP deflator, obtained from World Bank National Accounts. Government subsidies are defined as grants on current
account by the public authorities to (i) private industries and public corporations and (ii) government enterprises. The figures are
as percent of GDP averaged over 1983-91. Data are obtained from various issues of the World Competitiveness Report, The
World Economic Forum &IMD International, Geneva, Switzerland.
GDP/CAP  Growth  80-91  Inflation  80-91  Government
(US $)  (percent)  (percent)  subsidies  to private
and public
enterprises  83-91
Switzerland  27,492  1.7  3.8  1.4
Japan  23,584  3.9  1.5  0.6
Norway  19,664  1.7  5.2  5.9
Sweden  19,649  1.6  7.4  4.8
United  States  18,972  1.9  4.2  0.6
Finland  18,046  1.6  6.6  3.0
France  17,365  1.8  5.7  2.4
Austria  17,288  2.2  3.6  1.3
Netherlands  16,479  2.3  1.8  2.6
Germany  16,439  1.8  2.8  2.0
Canada  16,098  2.0  4.3  1.9
Belgium  16,051  2.2  4.2  3.5
Italy  14,570  2.5  9.5  2.9
Australia  13,095  1.6  7.0  3.0
United  Kingdom  12,585  2.3  5.8  1.5
New  Zealand  10,643  1.0  10.3  1.2
Singapore  10,294  4.9  1.9  1.9
Hong Kong  9,820  5.8  7.5  n.a.
Spain  8,752  3.3  8.9  2.4
Korea  4,259  6.8  5.6  6.3
Malaysia  2,465  3.6  1.7  4.6
South  Africa  2,198  -1.0  14.4  n.a.
Brazil  2,073  2.1  327.6  10.7
Mexico  1,801  1.0  66.5  2.3
Turkey  1,375  3.1  44.7  2.2
Jordan  1,372  -2.1  1.6  n.a.
Thailand  1,362  7.0  3.7  1.4
Zimbabwe  630  1.7  12.5  n.a.
India  375  3.3  8.2  5.8
Pakistan  359  3.9  7.0  5.4
36Table II
Institutional Indicators
Law and order indicator, produced by International Country Risk rating agency, reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country
are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. It is scored 0-6 with higher
scores indicating sound political institutions and a strong court system. Lower scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical
force  or illegal means to settle claims. Values reported are 1985-91 averages. Legal efficiency indicator, produced by Business
International Corporation, is an assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly
foreign firms. It is scored 0-10 with lower scores for lower efficiency levels. An average value for 1980-1983 is available. Common
Law Dummy takes the value one for common law countries and the value zero for others.. Creditor rights is an index that ranges
from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates creditor rights and Shareholder rights is an index that ranges from 0 to 5 and aggregates shareholder
rights as described in the text. These three variables are obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1996).
Market capitalization/GDP is the stock market capitalization divided by GDP. Turnover is the total value of shares traded divided by
market capitalization. Stock market data are from IFC's Emerging Market Data Base. Values are 1980-1991 averages. Bank/GDP is
the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP. It is obtained from IMF, International Financial Statistics. Bank is the
summation of IFS lines 22a through 22f. Values are 1980-1991 averages. GDP values are from World Bank National Accounts.
Law  and  Legal  Common  Creditor  Shareholder Market  Turnover  Bank/GDP
Order  Efficiency  Law  Rights  Rights  Capitalization/GDP
Indicator  Indicator  Dummy  Index  Index
Switzerland  6.00  10.00  0  1.50  1.00  0.75  0.40  1.56
Japan  5.00  10.00  0  2.25  3.00  0.96  0.52  1.21
Norway  6.00  10.00  0  2.20  3.00  0.18  0.41  0.75
Sweden  6.00  10.00  0  2.20  3.00  0.44  0.24  0.69
United  States  6.00  10.00  1  1.00  5.00  0.60  0.58  0.48
Finland  6.00  10.00  0  1.00  2.00  0.18  0.18  0.71
France  5.00  8.00  0  0.10  2.00  0.23  0.31  0.96
Austria  6.00  9.50  0  3.10  2.00  0.08  0.55  1.13
Netherlands  6.00  10.00  0  2.00  2.00  0.44  0.39  0.93
Germany  5.57  9.00  0  3.tO  1.00  0.24  1.22  1.04
Canada  6.00  9.25  1  1.00  4.00  0.46  0.28  0.48
Belgium  6.00  9.50  0  2.10  0.00  0.31  0.12  0.57
Italy  5.00  6.75  0  2.20  0.00  0.15  0.24  0.53
Australia  6.00  10.00  1  1.00  4.00  0.50  0.29  0.51
United  Kingdom  4.43  10.00  1  4.00  4.00  0.85  0.38  0.81
New Zealand  6.00  10.00  1  3.00  4.00  0.38  0.15  0.44
Singapore  5.00  10.00  1  4.00  3.00  0.93  0.32  0.94
Hong  Kong  4.71  10.00  1  4.00  4.00  1.19  0.40  n.a.
Spain  4.00  6.25  0  2.20  2.00  0.22  0.30  0.90
Korea  2.17  6.00  0  3.50  2.00  0.22  0.69  0.46
Malaysia  3.86  9.00  1  4.00  3.00  0.79  0.15  0.77
South  Africa  1.71  6.00  1  3.00  4.00  1.35  0.05  0.38
Brazil  4.00  5.75  0  1.20  3.00  0.11  0.48  0.23
Mexico  3.00  6.00  0  0.20  0.00  0.10  0.69  0.21
Turkey  2.67  4.00  0  2.20  2.00  0.05  0.08  0.25
Jordan  2.00  8.66  0  n.a.  1.00  0.47  0.13  0.66
Thailand  3.57  3.25  1  3.10  3.00  0.18  0.59  0.60
Zimbabwe  2.00  7.50  1  4.00  3.00  0.10  0.08  0.17
India  1.71  8.00  1  4.00  2.00  0.07  0.59  0.32
Pakistan  2.00  5.00  1  4.00  4.00  0.04  0.11  0.33
37Table III
Correlation  Matrices
Dependent variables are long term debt to total asset ratio (LTDTA), short term debt to total asset ratio (STDTA), and long term debt to total debt ratios (LTDTD). Independent variables are defined
as follows: NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. PROFIT is the income before interest and taxes divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. DIVTA is
the dividends divided by total assets. GDP/CAP is the GDP per capita. GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per capita. INFLATION is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. TOR is stock
market turnover defined as the total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization. MCAP/GDP is the stock market capitalization of the country divided by its GDP. BANK/GDP is the total
assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP. GOV. SUBS./GDP are the grants on current account by the public authorities to (i) private industries and public corporations and (ii) government
enterprises, divided by GDP. LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce
contracts. LEGAL is an index, scored 0 to  10, assessing the "efficiency  and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms." For both indices lower scores indicate
lower enforcement/efficiency levels. COMMON is a dummy variable that takes the value  I for common law countries and the value zero for others. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an index that ranges
from 0 to 5 and aggregates shareholder rights and CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates creditor rights as described in the text. All variables, except last four, are
averaged over 1980-91 when available, so that each country has one observation.  In panel A averages of firm level variables (LTDTA, STDTA, LTDTD, NFATA, PROFIT, NSNFA,  DIVTA) are
calculated for the largest and smallest firms separately. Panel B  calculates averages using all firms in the sample. Correlations reported are pearson correlation coefficients.  P-values are given  in
italics. Number of observations are reported under the respective p-values.
Panel A: Correlations of Dependent and Independent Variables
NFATA  PROFIT  NSNFA  DIVTA  GDP/CAP  GROWTH  INFL.  TOR  MCAP/  BANK  GOV.  LAW &  LEGAL  COMMON  SHR.  CRD.
GDP  /GDP  SUB./GDP  ORDER  RIGHTS  RIGHTS
Large  Firms
LTDTA  -.127  -.132  -.269  -.437  .676  -.226  -.372  .192  -.108  .290  -.205  .639  .460  -.194  .061  -.337
.511  .488  .158  .018  .000  .230  .043  .308  .569  .127  .316  .000  .011  .304  .748  .073
29  30  29  29  30  30  30  30  30  29  26  30  30  30  30  29
STDTA  -.520  .159  .553  .035  -.094  .262  -.229  -.108  -.286  .074  .072  -.338  -.353  -.334  -.282  .166
.004  .402  .002  .855  .620  .162  .223  .569  .125  .703  .725  .068  .056  .071  .132  .391
29  30  29  29  30  30  30  30  30  29  26  30  30  30  30  29
LTDTD  .152  -.173  -.470  -.290  .547  -.284  -.214  .193  .141  .186  -.291  .658  .533  .092  .209  -.343
.432  .360  .010  .127  .002  .128  257  .306  .458  .334  .149  .000  .003  .629  .268  .069
29  30  29  29  30  30  30  30  30  29  26  30  30  30  30  29
Small  Firms:
LTDTA  -.184  -.227  -.079  -.473  .655  -.146  -.231  .215  -.205  .208  -.044  .556  .402  -.303  -.052  -.331
.339  .228  .684  .010  .000  .443  .219  .253  .277  .278  .832  .001  .028  .103  .783  .080
29  30  29  29  30  30  30  30  30  29  26  30  30  30  30  29
STDTA  -.186  .414  .221  .023  -.320  .539  -.073  .070  -.289  -.121  .168  -.448  -.436  -.083  -.103  .309
.335  .023  .249  .907  .085  .002  .700  .714  .121  .533  .413  .013  .016  .664  .587  .103
29  30  29  29  30  30  30  30  30  29  26  30  30  30  30  29
LTDTD  -.163  -.318  -.133  -.462  .726  -.250  -.232  .211  -.099  .251  -.176  .685  .521  -.191  .009  -.397
.398  .087  .491  .012  .000  .183  .218  .263  .601  .189  .391  .000  .003  .313  .962  .033
29  30  29  29  30  30  30  30  30  29  26  30  30  30  30  29
38Panel B: Cross-Correlations of Independent Variables
PROFIT  NSNFA  DIVTA  GDP/CAP  GROWTH  INFL.  TOR  MCAP/  BANK  GOV.  LAW &  LEGAL  COMMON  SHR.  CRD.
GDP  /GDP  SUB./GDP  ORDER  RIGHTS  RIGHTS
NFATA  .122  -.612  .224  -.607  -.232  .639  -.050  -.069  -.621  .461  -.471  -.440  .171  .172  -.109
.527  .000  .252  .001  .226  .000  .798  .723  .000  .018  .010  .017  .374  .371  .583
PROFIT  .108  .818  -.423  .034  -.080  -.292  .095  -.378  -.090  -.504  -.494  .227  .177  .324
.576  .000  .020  .858  .675  .118  .619  .044  .663  .005  .006  .227  .350  .087
NSNFA  .001  .217  .255  -.431  .103  .144  .281  -.332  .035  .075  .219  .234  .231
.998  .258  .182  .020  .595  .457  .147  .098  .858  .698  .253  .222  .237
DIVTA  -.489  -.044  -.106  -.387  .350  -.349  -.299  -.465  -.351  .361  .204  .339
.007  .822  .585  .038  .063  .069  .146  .011  .062  .055  .289  .077
GDP/CAP  -.176  -.323  .196  .179  .697  -.404  .872  .709  -.350  -.053  -.429
.353  .082  .300  .343  .000  .041  .000  .000  .058  .781  .020
GROWTH  -.089  .164  .004  .054  .142  -.084  -.255  .194  .176  .426
.641  .387  .983  .779  .489  .658  .173  .305  .351  .021
INFLATION  .066  -.232  -.391  .649  -.179  -.363  -.197  -.013  -.258
.728  .218  .036  .000  .345  .049  .296  .948  .176
TOR  -.140  .262  -.013  .140  .025  -.211  -.187  -.040
.459  .170  .950  .460  .894  .263  .322  .835
MCAP/GDP  .367  -.436  .101  .414  .370  .412  .216
.050  .026  .595  .023  .044  .024  .259
BANKIGDP  -.391  .531  .521  -.351  -.189  -.038
.048  .003  .004  .062  .325  .847
GOV. SUBJGDP  -.381  -.286  -.210  -.056  .142
.055  .156  .303  .786  .488
LAW & ORDER  .699  -.206  .039  -.432
.000  .275  .837  .019
LEGAL  .026  .149  -.060
.891  .433  .757
COMMON  .722  .473
.000  .010




Firm-level variables are reported separately for large and small firms. These are defined as follows: LTDTA is long term debt to total
asset ratio, STDTA is short term debt to total asset ratio, and LTDTD is long term debt to total debt ratios. NFATA is the net fixed assets
divided by total  assets. PROFIT is the income before interest and taxes divided by total assets. NSNFA  is the net sales divided by net
fixed assets. DIVTA is the dividends divided by total assets. Institutional variables are available at the country level. GDP/CAP is the
GDP per capita in thousands of US$. GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per capita. INFLATION is the inflation rate of the
GDP deflator. TOR is stock market turnover defined as the total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization.  MCAP/GDP is
the stock market capitalization of the country divided by its GDP. BANK/GDP is the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by
GDP. GOV. SUBS./GDP are the grants on current account by the public authorities to (i) private industries and public corporations and
(ii) government enterprises, divided by GDP. LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country
are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts. LEGAL is an index, scored 0 to  10, assessing the
"efficiency  and  integrity  of the  legal environment as it affects  business,  particularly  foreign  firms."  For both  indices  lower  scores
indicate lower enforcement/efficiency  levels. COMMON is a dummy variable that takes the value  1 for common law countries  and the
value zero for others. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 5 and aggregates shareholder rights and CREDITOR
RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates creditor rights as described in the text. All variables, except the last four,
are averaged over  1980-91 when available, so that each country has one observation.
N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum
Large Firms
LTDTA  30  0.269  0.103  0.105  0.528
STDTA  30  0.326  0.099  0.170  0.489
LTDTD  30  0.446  0.125  0.248  0.706
NFATA  29  0.412  0.104  0.227  0.704
PROFIT  30  0.100  0.032  0.070  0.202
NSNFA  29  4.687  3.738  0.883  19.632
DIVTA  29  0.019  0.012  0.002  0.052
Small Firms
LTDTA  30  0.175  0.115  0.056  0.500
STDTA  30  0.338  0.088  0.227  0.538
LTDTD  30  0.321  0.146  0.158  0.664
NFATA  29  0.355  0.088  0.149  0.534
PROFIT  30  0.110  0.044  0.048  0.273
NSNFA  29  6.236  3.545  1.436  16.997
DIVTA  29  0.028  0.022  0.002  0.088
Economic and Institutional Variables
GDP/CAP  30  10.234  7.737  0.299  26.348
GROWTH  30  0.024  0.020  -0.023  0.070
INFLATION  30  0.141  0.341  0.016  1.866
TOR  30  0.364  0.248  0.053  1.221
MCAP/GDP  30  0.419  0.358  0.043  1.351
BANK/GDP  29  0.654  0.335  0.163  1.562
GOV. SUBS./GDP  26  3.130  2.262  0.600  10.686
LAW & ORDER  30  4.447  1.597  1.714  6.000
LEGAL  30  8.247  2.069  3.250  10.000
COMMON  30  0.433  0.504  0.000  1.000
SHR. RIGHTS  30  2.533  1.332  0.000  5.000
CRD. RIGHTS  29  2.453  1.224  0.100  4.000
40Table V
Determinants of Debt Maturity
Panel  A: Long-Term  Debt  --  The regression equation estimated is: LTD/TA = a + PIGDP/CAP + [3 2NFATA +  P3 PROFIT +04
NSNFA  +P5GROWTH  +  136 TOR  +  P7BANK/GDP  +  P[  GOV.  SUBS./GDP  +  P9 INFLATION  +  PjoLAW  &  ORDER  +
P,,SHAREHOLDER  RIGHTS +  P12 CREDITOR RIGHTS +  1313 COMMON-LAW DUMMY + e. Dependent variable  (LTD/TA) is  the
long term debt to total  asset ratio. GDP/CAP is the GDP per capita. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total  assets. PROFIT is the
income before interest and taxes divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. GROWTH is the growth rate of
the real GDP per capital. TOR is stock market turnover defined as the total value of shares divided by market capitalization.  BANK/GDP is
the total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP. GOV. SUBS./GDP are the grants on current account by the public authorities
to (i) private industries and public corporations  and (ii) govemment enterprises, divided by GDP. INFLATION is the inflation rate of the
GDP deflator. LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to  utilize the existing
legal system to  mediate  disputes and enforce contracts. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS is an index that ranges  from 0 to 5  and aggregates
shareholder  rights and CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates creditor rights as described in the text.
COMMON- LAW DUMMY takes the value  I for common law countries and the value zero for others. All variables, except the last three,
are averaged over 1980-91. White's  heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in parantheses.
Large Firms  Small Firms
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
GDP/CAP  .009***  .010***
(.002)  (.002)
NFATA  .287**  .469**
(.130)  (.208)
PROFIT  .281  .189
(.336)  (.398)
NSNFA  -.002  .007
(.002)  (.006)
GROWTH  -.434  -.411
(.501)  (.959)
TOR  .111***  .113*
(.035)  (.062)
BANK/GDP  -.052  -.094
(.040)  (.052)
GOV. SUBS./GDP  .019***  .026***
(.006)  (.007)
INFLATION  -.275***  -.263***
(.028)  (.043)
LAW & ORDER  .043***  .052**
(.010)  (.019)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS  .023**  .015
(.009)  (.013)
CREDITOR RIGHTS  -.014  -.011
(.009)  (.015)
COMMON-LAW DUMMY  -.074**  -.106***
(.031)  (.041)
Adj. R 2 .44  .62  .41  .28
No. of Observations  30  26  30  26
**  and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and  I percent respectively.
41Panel  B: Short-Term  Debt  -- The regression equation estimated is: STDITA = a + PIGDP/CAP + P2NFATA +  033 PROFIT +P4
NSNFA  +13 5GROWTH  +  36 TOR  +  P 7BANK/GDP  +  Pg  GOV.  SUBS./GDP  +  39 INFLATION  +  PIOLAW  &  ORDER  +
,i,SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS + P,2  CREDITOR RIGHTS + ,13 COMMON-LAW  DUMMY +  e. Dependent  variable (STD/TA)  is  the
short term debt to total asset ratio. GDP/CAP is the GDP per capita. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total  assets. PROFIT is the
income before interest and taxes divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. GROWTH is the growth rate of
the real GDP  per capital.  TOR  is stock  market  tumover  defined  as the total value  of shares divided  by market  capitalization.  BANK/GDP  is
the total assets  of the deposit  money  banks  divided  by GDP. GOV.  SUBS./GDP  are the grants  on current  account  by the public authorities
to (i) private industries  and public corporations  and (ii) government  enterprises,  divided  by GDP.  INFLATION  is the inflation  rate of the
GDP deflator.  LAW & ORDER,  scored I to 6, is an indicator  of the degree  to which  citizens  of a country  are able to utilize the existing
legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  SHAREHOLDER  RIGHTS  is an index that ranges from 0 to 5 and aggregates
shareholder  rights and CREDITOR  RIGHTS  is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates  creditor  rights as described  in the text.
COMMON-  LAW DUMMY  takes the value I for common  law  countries  and the value zero for others.  All variables,  except the last three,
are averaged  over 1980-91.  White's  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  are given  in parantheses.
Large Firms  Small Firms
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
GDP/CAP  -.001  -.003
(.002)  (.002)
NFATA  -.601***  .035
(.110)  (.113)
PROFIT  .738**  .286
(.365)  (.302)
NSNFA  .005*  .019***
(.003)  (.005)
GROWTH  .274  2.838***
(.598)  (.638)
TOR  -.035  -.005
(.028)  (.045)
BANK/GDP  -.044  -.094**
(.034)  (.026)
GOV. SUBS./GDP  .007  -.006
(.007)  (.008)
INFLATION  -.037  .016
(.031)  (.032)
LAW & ORDER  -.033***  -.008
(.010)  (.008)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS  .012  -.006
(.008)  (.010)
CREDITOR RIGHTS  .001  .006
(.007)  (.009)
COMMON-LAW DUMMY  -.103**  -.068
(.036)  (.042)
Adj. R
2 .00  .75  .07  .69
No. of Observations  30  26  30  26
**  and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
42Panel C: Debt Maturity - The regression  equation  estimated is: LTDITD-  a + PIGDP/CAP + P2NFATA  + P3  PROFIT  +P4
NSNFA +,B 5GROWTH  +  I6 TOR +  37BANK/GDP  +  Pe GOV. SUBS./GDP +  19  INFLATION +  P,oLAW &  ORDER +
PI SHAREHOLDER  RIGHTS  + P12  CREDITOR  RIGHTS  + 013  COMMON-LAW  DUMMY  + p14  TD/TA 1.1 + e. Dependent  variable
(LTDITD)  is the long  term debt to total debt ratio.  GDP/CAP  is the GDP  per capita.  NFATA  is the net fixed assets  divided  by total assets.
PROFIT  is the income  before  interest  and taxes divided  by total  assets.  NSNFA  is the net sales divided  by net fixed assets.  GROWTH  is
the growth rate of the real GDP per capital. TOR is stock market tumover defined as the total value of shares divided by market
capitalization.  BANKI/GDP  is the total assets  of the deposit  money banks  divided  by GDP. GOV.  SUBS./GDP  are the grants on current
account by the public authorities  to (i) private industries  and public corporations  and (ii) govemment enterprises,  divided by GDP.
INFLATION  is the inflation  rate of the GDP  deflator.  LAW  & ORDER,  scored I to 6, is an indicator  of the degree  to which  citizens of a
country  are able to utilize  the existing  legal system  to mediate  disputes  and  enforce  contracts.  SHAREHOLDER  RIGHTS  is an index  that
ranges from 0 to 5 and aggregates  shareholder  rights and CREDITOR  RIGHTS  is an index that ranges from 0 to 4.5 and aggregates
creditor  rights as described  in the text. COMMON-  LAW DUMMY  takes the value I for common  law countries  and the value zero for
others.  TD/TA,.I  is total leverage  one period  lagged.  All variables,  except shareholder  rights,  creditor  rights  and common  law dummy,  are
averaged  over 1980-91.  White's  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  are  given in parantheses.
Large Firms  Small Firms
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
GDP/CAP  .009***  .014***
(.003)  (.003)
NFATA  .682***  .022
(.101)  (.209)
PROFIT  -.838*  -.192
(.461)  (.423)
NSNFA  -.006*  -.022**
(.003)  (.009)
GROWTH  -.441  -3.962***
(.736)  (1.266)
TOR  .089**  .050
(.036)  (.073)
BANK/GDP  -.018  .108*
(.038)  (.058)
GOV. SUBS./GDP  -.002  .012
(.008)  (.0  10)
INFLATION  -.136**  -.078
(.056)  (.054)
LAW & ORDER  .055***  .031*
(.010)  (.018)
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS  .003  .005
(.012)  (.015)
CREDITOR RIGHTS  -.010  -.017
(.010)  (.016)
COMMON-LAW DUMMY  .059  .115*
(.051)  (.061)
TD/TA,1 .236  .821***
(.173)  (.176)
Adj. R2 .27  .73  .51  .66
No. of Observations  30  26  30  26
**  and ***  indicate significance levels of 15, 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
43Table  VI
Impact  of Creditor  Rights
The regression equation estimated is specification (2) from Table V, panels A, B, and C. Aggregate  creditor rights variable is replaced by
individual indicators. Creditor right variables are restrictions for going into reorganization, automatic stay on assets, secured creditors paid
first, management  stays in  reorganization,  and legal reserve requirement  as  a percentage  of  capital.  Entries  are respective  coefficient
estimates for the individual legal indicator obtained from the basic equation. White's  heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given
in parantheses.
Large Firms  Small Firms
LTD/TA
CREDITOR RIGHTS  -.014  -.011
(.009)  (.015)
Restrictions for going into reorganization  -.018  -.050
(.036)  (.057)
Automatic stay on assets  -.009  .083**
(.027)  (.036)
Secured creditors first paid  -.039  .095
(.036)  (.076)
Management stays in reorganization  .029  -.106
(.037)  (.072)
Legal reserve required as % of capital  .020  -.303
(.143)  (.248)
STD/TA:
CREDITOR RIGHTS  .001  .006
(.007)  (.009)
Restrictions for going into reorganization  -.011  .003
(.027)  (.026)
Automatic stay on assets  .006  .040*
(.021)  (.021)
Secured creditors first paid  .044*  -.025
(.024)  (.026)
Management stays in reorganization  -.018  -.072***
(.032)  (.036)
Legal reserve required as % of capital  -.034  .015
(.079)  (.102)
LTD/TD:
CREDITOR RIGHTS  -.010  -.017
(.010)  (.016)
Restrictions for going into reorganization  .011  .020
(.035)  (.038)
Automatic stay on assets  -.016  -.049
(.023)  (.040)
Secured creditors first paid  -.072**  .017
(.030)  (.041)
Management stays in reorganization  .062  .157***
(.037)  (.056)
Legal reserve required as % of capital  .082  .040
(.116)  (.143)
**  and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
44Appendix
Number  of Firms and the Sample Period
Number of Firms  Time Period
Australia  401  1983-91
Austria  44  1983-91
Belgium  89  1983-91
Brazil*  100  1985-91
Canada  494  1983-91
Switzerland  150  1983-91
Germany  359  1983-91
Spain  116  1983-91
Finland  55  1983-91
France  544  1983-91
United Kingdom  1275  1983-91
Hong Kong  173  1983-91
India*  100  1980-90
Italy  81  1983-91
Jordan*  38  1980-90
Japan  1104  1983-91
Korea*  100  1980-90
Mexico*  100  1984-91
Malaysia  143  1983-91
Netherlands  165  1983-91
Norway  52  1983-91
New Zealand  41  1983-91
Pakistan*  100  1980-88
Singapore  213  1983-91
Sweden  68  1983-91
Thailand  137  1983-91
Turkey*  45  1982-90
United States  3247  1983-91
South Africa  67  1983-91
Zimbabwe*  48  1980-88
For those countries with $, the data source for the firm level variables is IFC's corporate finance data base. Otherwise, the
data are from Global Vantage data base.
45Variable  Definitions  and Sources
Firm-Level  Data:
Global  Vantage  definitions:
Variables  are from the industry/commercial  tape of Global  Vantage  data base, frozen as of December
1995.
LTD/TA=  (total liabilities-current  liabilities)/total  assets=(DAI  18-DAI  04)/DA89.
STD/TA=current  liabilities/total  assets=  DA104/DA89.
LTD/TD=  (total liabilities-current  liabilities)/total  liabilities=  (DAI 18-DA  104)/DAI  18.
TD/TA=  total liabilities/total  assets=  DA 18/DA89.
NFATA=  net fixed  assets/total  assets=DA76/DA89.
PROFIT=  (income  before  income  taxes+interest  expenses)/total  assets=  (DA2  1  +DA  1  5)/DA89.
NSNFA=  net sales/net  fixed  assets= DA1/DA76.
DIVTA=total  dividends/total  assets=  DA34/DA89.
For the 8 countries  that are from IFC's corporate  finance  data base, variables  were created  according
to the definitions  given  above.
Other  data sources:
Inflation is the annual in-lation  of the GDP deflator  and is obtained  from World  Bank National
Accounts.
Real GDP per capita  and its growth  rate are obtained  from World  Bank National  Accounts.
Bank/gdp  is the deposit  money  bank domestic  assets to gdp, obtained  from IMF, Intemational
Financial  Statistics,  various years. Deposit  money  domestic  assets are the summation  of IFS lines
22a through  22f.
Stock  market variables,  market  capitalization  and turnover,  are from IFC's Emerging  Markets Data
Base.  The original  source for developed  countries  is Morgan  Stanley  Capital  International.
Law and Order indicator  is obtained  from ICRG,  Intemational  Country  Risk Guide.  It has been used
by Knack, S. and P. Keefer,  1995,  Institutions  and Economic  Performance:Cross-country  Tests
Using Altemative  Institutional  Measures,  Economics  and Politics  7 (3):207-227.
Legal efficiency  indicator  is from Business  Intemational  Corporation.
Other legal indicators,  common  law dummy,  creditor  rights and shareholder  rights indicators  are
obtained  from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer  and Vishny  (1996).
Government  subsidies  to private  and public  enterprises  data are obtained from various issues  of the
World  Competitiveness  Report,  The World  Economic  Forum & IMD International,  Geneva,
Switzerland.
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